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Abstract 
 
This paper will describe and analyse the development of Basel II Capital Accord and will 
focus on the use of external ratings in the Standardized Approach in Basel II. Furthermore 
it will examine the problem of adverse selection which appears in Basel II as a result from 
the proposal for the use of external ratings in determining the risk weights in the 
standardized approach. The paper will also attempt to find possible solutions to the adverse 
selection problem by discussing two similar models, and derive implications from them. 
 
Keywords: Basel II, external ratings, adverse selection, rating agencies, standardized 
approach 
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1. Introduction. 
The introduction of the New Basel Capital Accord has been widely discussed across the 
financial community. The opinions about the New Accord are controversial. On the one 
hand, it has been approved as a necessary step towards more sound financial regulation 
considering the entrance of more technologically advanced financial services, instruments 
and techniques in the last decades, along with the trend towards globalization of the 
financial markets. The approval of Basel II has been based mainly on the introduction of 
the three mutually reinforcing pillars which complement each other to form an overarching 
risk-management structure for the promotion of financial stability. 
 
On the other hand, the New Accord has been criticized for posing some opportunities and 
challenges for the financial institutions around the world. Firstly, the Basel II Accord 
implementation strongly depends on good and reliable data and information. Basel II also 
requires banks to develop well-functioning, efficient and integrated risk-management 
systems which for a large portion of banks will be slow and costly process. It has also been 
argued that Basel II is related to pro-cyclicality, because it could generate more pronounced 
business cycles in an economy especially in a recessionary period when banks will curtail 
lending as a result of the increase of borrowers’ credit risk. Other challenges like cross-
border capital flow decrease, risk-sensitivity to the corporate sector and the introduction of 
the operational costs are also seen as a potential threat to economic and financial stability. 
Last but not least is the problem of adverse selection. 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to attempt to answer the question of whether there is a 
conceptual problem in Basel II leading to adverse selection and how can it be fixed. Firstly, 
the paper discusses how the need for new capital accord has arisen and what are the main 
differences between the 1988 Capital Accord and the New Capital Accord. Then the paper 
continues with an analysis of the use of external credit ratings in the standardized approach 
of the New Capital Accord and discusses the role of the external credit assessment 
institutions as a conductor of a private information between lender and borrower, and what 
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potential impact their ratings might have on the relationship between the two 
counterparties. 
 
The problem of adverse selection is discussed from the perspectives of two models which 
serve as a benchmark of the adverse selection problem which arises in Basel II and 
important implications are drawn from the two models for the dynamics of an asymmetric 
information problem and how it can be solved from banking and regulatory perspective. 
 
 
2. From Basel I to Basel II. 
 
In this section I am going to explain briefly the evolution of Basel Capital Accord, and the 
main characteristics of the two important steps made by the Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision, namely Basel I and the New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II).  
 
2.1 Basel I – the first step towards financial stability. 
 
In the past 20 years, there has been a formalized introduction of capital requirements by a 
wide range of countries. This development was initiated by the adoption of minimal capital 
requirements in particular countries (for example, the UK and the USA in 1981) but in 
1988 with the introduction of the Basel Accord, common minimum capital requirements 
were adopted by the G-10. Nowadays, the accord has been implemented by around 100 
countries world-wide.1 Basel I, the framework of minimum capital standards introduced in 
1988 by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was designed to increase 
the safety and soundness of the international banking system and to set a level playing field 
for banking regulation. 
      
The Basel Committee had two main objectives by adopting the 1988 Capital Accord. The 
first objective was related to strengthening the soundness and stability of the international 
banking system by encouraging international banking organizations to improve their capital 
                                                  
1 See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (April 1999), p.1 
2 See loc. cit. 
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positions. The second objective was to reduce the competitive inequalities among 
internationally active banks by applying a standard approach to all of them. Thus, the 
structure of the framework intended to:  
- increase the sensitivity of the regulatory capital to differences in risk profiles among                                                                        
banking organizations; 
- take off-balance-sheet exposures explicitly into account in assessing capital 
adequacy; and 
- lower the disincentives to holding liquid, low risk assets.2 
 
For the above objectives Basel I was equipped with only a minimum capital requirements 
rule. It has been praised for achieving its initial goals, but also criticized because of the low 
risk sensitivity of the capital requirements which may lead to greater risk taking and 
regulatory capital arbitrage practices by banks.3 
      
In brief, the Basel Capital Accord requires that a bank have available as “regulatory 
capital” at least 8 percent of the value of its risk-weighted assets and asset-equivalent off-
balance-sheet exposures. The different types of assets are weighted according to the level of 
perceived risk that each type represents and each off-balance-sheet exposure is converted to 
its equivalent amount of assets and weighted as that type of asset would be weighted. For 
example commercial loans are weighted at 100 percent and residential housing which are 
considered to be less risky are weighted at 50 percent. Total risk-weighted assets are 
multiplied by 8 percent to determine the bank’s minimum capital requirement. An 
important indicator of an institution’s financial strength is whether bank’s capital ratio - its 
regulatory capital as a proportion of its risk-weighted assets - meets or exceeds the 8 
percent minimum.4 
      
As mentioned above, Basel I is considered to have met its main objectives of promoting 
financial stability and providing an equitable basis for competition among internationally 
                                                  
 
3 See Elizalde, A. (2007), p.1 
4 See Federal Reserve Bulletin (2003), p.396 
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active banks. It has also become an adequate capital framework for most of the banks in the 
USA. On the other hand it has also been noticed that Basel I has lost its relevance at least 
for the larger banking organizations. The three main reasons for this are: 
- it has serious shortcomings when applied to larger entities; 
- there has been an evolution in the art of risk management at the largest banks; 
- the banking industry has become increasingly concentrated.5 
 
With regard to the internationally active banks Basel I provides a limited differentiation in 
the degrees of risk which may lead to a misleading information about banks’ capital 
adequacy. Moreover, the limited differentiation may also create incentives for the banks to 
pursue exposures for which the capital requirement is lower and avoid exposures with 
higher capital requirement. As a result of capital arbitrage, the regulatory minimum capital 
ratios of the larger banking institutions can become less meaningful. Thus, for those banks 
Basel I is inadequate in terms of risk measurement and banks’ capital strength evaluation.  
 
2.2 The New Basel Capital Accord. 
“Addressing the perceived shortcomings and structural weaknesses of Basel I, the Basel II 
Accord – a landmark regulatory framework – offers a newer and comprehensive approach 
and methodology for financial sector regulatory capital calculation which recognizes well 
the advancements and innovations in banks’ businesses, policies and structures and the 
accompanying financial engineering and innovation.”6.  
Basel II has some distinct characteristics worth to be mentioned: 
- it aligns banks’ capital with their basic risk profiles; 
- it is more detailed and superior in terms of coverage and details; 
- it has the ability to exploit effectively new frontiers of risk management and gives 
impetus to the development of sound risk management systems, which are expected 
to promote efficiency and more prudent allocation of resources; 
                                                  
5 See Federal Reserve Bulletin (2003), p.396 
6 Akhtar (2006), p.1 
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- it is perceived to be a basic step for future disposition of banking supervision and 
the evolutionary path on which the banking industry would thread; and 
- it is designed to make risk management systems more robust and flexible with 
regard to complexities arising out of a host of new risks.7 
The above characteristics make Basel II much more sophisticated and are perceived to be 
an adequate response to the increasing complexity of banking industries and financial 
markets as a whole. 
 
In contrast to Basel I, the New Basel Capital Accord consists of three pillars: 
     (1) minimum capital requirements; 
     (2) supervisory review process; 
     (3) market discipline. 
All three pillars are interlinked and mutually reinforce each other. The capital requirements 
rule, contained both in Basel I and in Pillar I of Basel II, requires banks to hold a minimum 
capital level as a function of their risk level. In a risk sensitive capital rule the higher the 
assets risk the higher the fraction of those assets that has to be funded with capital. 
Although Basel I already incorporates some limited degree of risk sensitivity, Pillar 1 of 
Basel II significantly increases the risk sensitivity of the capital rule. Pillar 1 presents the 
calculation of the total minimum capital requirements for credit, market and operational 
risk. Pillar 2 supervisory review process validates banks’ internal assessments by ensuring 
that the whole array of risks has been taken care of. Pillar 3 serves as a complement to the 
other two pillars by requiring financial reporting transparency to promote market discipline. 
 
The capital ratio in Pillar 1 is calculated using the definition of regulatory capital and risk 
weighted assets and must be no lower than 8 percent (Tier 2 capital is limited to 100% of 
Tier 1 capital).8 While this is consistent with Basel I, the new framework gives recognition 
to new risk mitigation techniques thus shifting the emphasis from regulatory to economic 
capital framework. Therefore, Basel II does not promote higher capital requirements but 
                                                  
7 See Akhtar (2006), p.1 
8 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004), p.12 
9 See Akhtar (2006), p.2 
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instead focuses on efficient and effective capital allocation, which in case of sharpened risk 
articulation will lead to reduced capital requirements, but in case of bad risk management 
may result in punitive capital requirements.9 
 
Basel II is flexible in different aspects of its implementation. For example, depending on 
their “level of advancement” banks may choose from different alternatives with regard to 
credit risk. The Standardised Approach is the simplest level, which is similar to Basel I, but 
contains more risk weights which are fixed by the authorities. In addition, banks may 
increase the range of risk weights by using credit risk assessments from rating agencies like 
Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch. The more advanced approach for calculation is the 
“Internal Ratings Based”(IRB). Under the foundation IRB approach the risk weights and 
therefore capital requirements are based partly on the individual bank’s internal estimates. 
There is an advanced version in which even greater parts of the capital requirements is 
determined by bank’s own calculations. There are also basic and advanced levels for 
market and operational risks. But in any case banks have an incentive to move to a more 
advanced level because of the closer alignment of required capital and bank’s actual risk.10  
 
The IRB approach is to be used by biggest and most complex internationally active 
institutions. This approach and especially the advanced version of it gives the bigger 
banking institutions an advantage with respect to the calculation of capital requirements 
since in the Standardised Approach the risk weights are exactly stated and cannot be 
“flexible” as in the IRB approach. Thus, with more precise calculations the international 
active banks can use lower capital requirements.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
 
10 See Lind (2005), p. 28 
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3. External ratings in Basel II. 
The Basel II capital framework envisions a three-pillar approach to enhancing a safe and 
sound financial institutions: 
 
(i) minimum capital requirements; 
(ii) enhanced supervision; and 
(iii) market discipline through additional public disclosures. 
 
With the three pillars complementing and supporting each other, the first pillar has received 
most of the attention because of its direct effect on banks’ risk management and financial 
activities. As mentioned in the previous section, Pillar 1 lays the calculation of the total 
minimum capital requirements for credit, market and operational risk. This section is 
focused on credit risk and will summarize and discuss the standardized approach to credit 
risk and the important role of the External Credit Assessment Institutions (ECAIs). 11 
 
3.1 Standardized Approach to Credit Risk in Basel II. 
One of the two alternatives proposed to the banks by the Basel Committee for calculating 
their capital requirements for credit risk was to measure credit risk in a standardized 
manner, supported by external credit assessments.12 The Standardized Approach increases  
the risk sensitivity of the capital framework by recognizing that different counterparties 
within the same loan category present different risks to the lender, therefore, instead of 
putting all commercial loans in the 100% risk weight basket, the approach takes into 
account the credit rating of the borrower. For example, assets representing claims against 
corporations (including insurance companies) are risk-weighted according to the credit 
rating assigned to the corporation or the asset. The table below shows the risk weights for 
corporate claims: 
 
 
                                                  
11 The examples related to ECAIs and the Standardized Approach will be focused mainly on the Claims on 
Corporates and the notations follow the methodology used by Standard & Poor’s as stated in Basel II Accord 
12 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004), p.15 
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Table 1 
 
Source: BCBS (June 2004), “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards” 
 
The credit assessments above must be assigned by an external rating agency that satisfies 
criteria which are described in the Capital Accord. As can be seen above, the capital 
framework provides a standard 100% risk weight for unrated claims on corporates 
(including insurance companies). In addition to this, the framework states that no claim on 
an unrated corporate may be given a risk weight which is preferential to that assigned to its 
sovereign of incorporation.13 
 
The minimum capital requirements for credit risk in Basel II (and Basel I as well) are set 
according to the following formulas: 
1
n
i i
i
RW A RWA
=
´ =å                                                                   (1) 
0.08RWA RC´ =                                                                   (2) 
 
where:  iRW = risk weight attached to asset “i”             iA = asset “i” (i=1,….n) 
            RWA = risk-weighted assets                          RC = regulatory capital 
 
As can be seen in formula (2) above, the minimum capital requirement for a bank is 8 
percent of its risk-weighted assets. The difference between Basel I and the standardized 
approach to credit risk is the choice of risk weights ( iRW ) involved in the calculations in 
formula (1). “While Basel I only recognizes a simple OECD/non-OECD distinction to set 
risk-weights for corporate, interbank and sovereign clams, the standardized approach aims 
                                                  
13 See loc. cit., p.18 
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at providing a greater sensitivity to credit risk by linking risk-weights to the assessments 
provided by ECAIs”.14 This means that banks will rely on the assessments made by ECAIs 
recognized by supervisors in calculating their regulatory capital.  
 
In general, the use of the standardized approach has different effects for different banking 
institutions and cannot provide us with a clear overall conclusion of whether it leads to an 
increase or decrease of the capital requirements. For example, in the U.S., “According to 
Banking Department estimates, the revised Standardized Approach to credit risk could lead 
to a decrease on average of 7% in minimum capital requirements”.15 Moreover, a relatively 
small part of this decrease is accounted for due to recognition of corporate ratings: 
 
Source: Wyatt (2003), New York State Banking Department (NYSBD), “Basel II’s New Standardized 
Approach: Possible Effects of Implementation” 
 
The above chart depicts the drivers of decrease in aggregate required capital for 27 
depository institutions. As it is shown in this chart, the recognition of corporate ratings 
accounts for only 9 percent of the decrease in capital requirements. This shows that the 
introduction of external ratings for corporations in the calculation of banks’ regulatory 
capital may play a small role in the decrease of capital requirements in general. 
 
 
                                                  
14 Van Roy (2005), p.11 
15 Wyatt (2003), p.14 
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3.2 ECAIs and their role in Basel II. 
Credit rating agencies (also called CRAs) or ECAIs in Basel II, provide investors, lenders 
and others with opinions on the future creditworthiness of a particular company, security or 
obligation as of a given date. Issuers and corporate borrowers pay for these opinions issued 
by CRAs to help them raise capital. The general view about rating agencies is that they are 
information specialists who obtain information that is not in the public domain. Therefore, 
their importance comes from the fact that obtaining non-public specific information is 
expensive and rating agencies are low-cost information providers. The standardized 
approach relies on credit ratings of borrowers assigned by ECAIs to compute banks’ 
required capital for credit risk. 
 
Although there has been a substantial amount of research on the activities of the CRAs, 
their role in the financial markets is still ambiguous. On the one hand, the secrecy of rating 
agencies makes the rating process unclear to the market observers, on the other hand, these 
observers are struggling to understand how the market perceives this process and how the 
ratings influence the rated firms and their outstanding debt. A credit rating agency has 
strong incentives to provide credible ratings. In addition to maximizing her reputation, the 
CRA has to take into account the competitive pressures from other agencies or from 
institutions selling similar products. Additionally, the rating agency may consider potential 
feedback effects that the rating will have on the rated firm from the perspective of securing 
future business with this firm.16 
 
This section will concentrate on the activities of the external credit assessment institutions, 
some criticisms on these activities and their importance for regulation purposes in Basel II 
capital accord. Since this paper’s main idea is concerned with discussing the adverse 
selection problem in lender-borrower relationship under Basel II, it is important to mention 
that credit rating agencies play a significant role in this relationship because, on the one 
hand, their rating evaluation of the borrower serves as an input into the risk weights which 
determine the amount of regulatory capital the bank must hold and, on the other hand, it is 
                                                  
16 See Bannier/Tyrell (2005), p.1  
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the borrower who pays the rating agency to evaluate his creditworthiness and therefore the 
actions of the borrower (to purchase a rating or not) are influenced  by his beliefs about 
what the rating will be vis-à-vis no rating.  
 
An important issue concerning ECAIs in Basel II is the difference between solicited and 
unsolicited ratings. Solicited and unsolicited ratings differ from each other in that the rating 
agency is not compensated by the firm for an unsolicited rating. As a general rule Basel II 
states that banks should use solicited ratings from eligible ECAIs. However, national 
supervisory authorities may allow banks to use unsolicited ratings in the same way as the 
solicited ratings.17  
There exists a certain controversy about the use of unsolicited ratings since rating agencies 
can use them to put pressure on firms to pay for a solicited rating. “Rating agencies argue 
that they are responsible for the protection of investors and that they inform investors of the 
risk of a firm. According to their argument, when an issuer has not applied for a rating but 
there is sufficient information to make a judgment and investors would find the opinion 
valuable, rating agencies may assign a rating regardless of remuneration.”.18 Furthermore, 
Bannier and Tyrell (2005) find that the main difference between solicited and unsolicited 
ratings is contingent on the gap between the rating agency’s private information about the 
firm’s credit quality and the quality a priori expected by the market. An important 
observation about solicited ratings is that they are strongly influenced by the different 
components of the agency’s utility function. Bannier and Tyrell (2006) find that for 
sufficiently good private information, a solicited rating will be the higher the more 
emphasis is put on the reputational aim and the less weight is attached to competitive and 
feedback concerns.19 Therefore, we can expect that the evaluations of the different credit 
rating agencies may turn out to be quite different from each other.  
 
The purpose of all said above is to emphasize that the rating of a corporate borrower may 
differ with regard to the choice of a rating agency to issue the rating. This may not only be 
                                                  
17 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004), p.26 
18 See Byoun/Shin (2002), p.4  
19 See Bannier/Tyrell (2005), p.2 
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a result of the different emphasis on the components of the agency’s utility function, but 
also of differences in opinion, rating scale, methodology etc. Those differences in credit 
ratings are likely to create also differences in regulatory risk weights and therefore in 
capital requirements for the lending institution. From the point of view of banks, the 
regulatory capital requirements in Basel II  incurs costs in the form of equity capital which 
should be kept against loans with different risk. From the point of view of borrowers, their 
riskiness also is costly for them because the more risky they appear through their rating to 
the bank, the more costly will the loan be for them or they may not be approved for the 
loan. Therefore, the borrower has the choice to remain unrated or to buy a rating from a 
rating agency.  
 
4. The Adverse Selection Problem. 
The problem of adverse selection arises from precontractual ex-ante asymmetric 
information. A bank is facing adverse selection if the profitability of a loan depends on the 
type of a borrower and if a higher price for the loan (i.e. interest rate), not only attracts less 
borrowers but also attracts less desirable borrowers. This is a  type of borrowers who invest 
in high-risk projects and face a higher probability of default. Closely related to the adverse 
selection models are the signaling models. In these models the informed agent may reveal 
his private information through the signal which he sends to the principal.20 
 
Under Basel regulation, banks are required to fund their loans with equity. Under Basel II 
Capital Accord, the equity ratio depends on the credit risk of the borrower, which has to be 
determined by a rating agency and the credit assessment by the agency is mapped into a 
risk weights which are exogenously determined by the Basel Committee.21 
 
As we can see in Table 1, high-risk corporate borrowers rated below BB- (Standard & 
Poor’s) will receive a risk weight of 150%, while unrated borrowers and borrowers with 
rating BBB+ to BB-, will be risk-weighted at 100%. 
                                                  
20 See Janda (2006), p.2  
21 See Table 1 
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Obviously, there is an adverse selection problem which arises because of the higher risk 
weights assigned to borrowers who are rated below BB- compared to the risk weights 
assigned to unrated borrowers. The adverse selection problem stems from the fact that risky 
borrowers (risk-weighted at 150%) will cost more equity to the bank and therefore will bear 
higher costs of borrowing from it. Therefore, a logical consequence from this event will be 
that a risky borrower would rather remain unrated (risk-weighted at 100% according to 
Basel II), than pay for a rating which will most likely reveal his quality which will translate 
into a 150% risk weight for the bank and will increase cost of borrowing money from the 
bank for the borrower. We should also pay attention that there is an issue of signaling 
where low-ability borrowers will possibly alter their behavior to secure a lower capital 
requirement for their borrowing. Therefore, in the case of a bank using the Basel II 
Standardized Approach, the only credible signal for the bank about the quality of the 
borrower is if the borrower purchased a rating or remains unrated.  
 
From the point of view of the borrower there are three main scenarios: 
 
a) if the borrower is risky and believes that if rated he will fall into the lowest rating (below 
BB-, corresponding to 150% risk weight), then he will remain unrated; 
 
b) if the borrower believes that his credit quality falls into the BBB+ to BB- bucket 
(corresponding to 100% risk weight), he will remain unrated unless the benefits from 
purchasing a rating are higher than the costs of purchasing it;.22 
 
c) if the borrower is of “good” type (better than BBB+) then he will purchase a rating, 
because he will enjoy better price of borrowing (since bank’s risk weight will be lower than 
100%). 
 
                                                  
22 Another possibility may be that he will remain unrated because he believes that the rating agency will 
assign a rating which is lower that he believes he deserves  
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Therefore, from the point of view of the bank, the uncertainty arises only in cases a) and b) 
since in case c) the bank will be informed about the quality of the borrower through the 
signal that he sends by purchasing a rating. 
 
From the above comments, an interesting question will be, to be able to find out in what 
conditions the borrower in case b) will purchase a rating and when he is going to remain 
unrated because of higher costs compared to benefits from getting a rating. In general, the 
costs of getting a rating can be measured as the price that borrower pays to receive a rating 
by a CRA. In some cases where the borrower has doubts about receiving the rating that he 
expects the costs can become bigger because of the uncertainty about getting the rating that 
the borrower expects, which depends on how stable are his arguments about getting the 
expected rating. If the arguments are not stable enough then there will be greater 
uncertainty about getting the expected rating. 
 
The benefits of getting rated by an external credit assessment institution can be: 
 
- an increase in the probability of accessing credit and a potential lower cost of 
borrowing (depending on the bank); 
- reputational gains; 
- more transparency (and therefore more trust by counterparties).  
 
 
As the above entries are difficult to measure and require deeper insight into the prcess of 
weighting the potential benefits, and as it is not this paper’s main purpose to provide this 
deeper insight, I will leave it as a topic of further research. 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to provide a general insight into the actions of the high-
risk borrower who faces adverse selection and the consequences of the adverse selection 
problem for the implementation of Basel II and, if there are any problems arising from the 
adverse selection, how they can be fixed. 
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In the following subsection I will present a model which can serve as a milestone for the 
perspective from which we can approach the adverse selection problem discussed by this 
paper. This model will serve as a benchmark according to which we can develop 
implications about the decision to buy a credit rating serving as a signaling device or the 
quality of the borrower. 
 
4.1 Models of adverse selection. 
In this section I will introduce two main models that can serve as benchmarks for 
describing and analyzing the adverse selection problem which arises from the use of 
external ratings in Basel II. These models are selected as benchmarks because of the 
common features that they share with the case of adverse selection discussed in this paper. 
 
4.1.1 Lender and Borrower as Principal and Agent . 23 
We start out by describing a simple principal-agent adverse selection problem discussed in 
Janda (2006) where the principal hires the agent to perform some activity. The result of this 
activity will be the monetary value x . We consider a risk neutral principal who is able to 
observe and verify the effort exercised by the agent. Since the effort is verifiable, it may 
enter directly as an argument into the utility function of the principal. The ex-ante 
asymmetric information is captured by the assumption that the agent may be of two types 
which cannot be distinguished by the principal observationally. The principal only knows 
that the agent can be  “good” (type G) and “bad” (type B), with probabilities p  and (1 )p-  
respectively. The difference between the two types is only in their disutility of effort, which 
is ( )v e  for type G, and . ( )k v e  for type B, with 1k > . Since the principal is not able to 
distinguish the observationally equivalent agents ex-ante, he may be able to distinguish 
them through the offer of menu of contracts {( , ), ( , )}G G B Be w e w , designed in a way that 
type G will choose the contract with the (effort, payment) combination ( , )G Ge w  and type B 
will choose the (effort, payment) combination ( , )B Be w . According to the revelation 
                                                  
23 This section is following the example of adverse selection problem described in Janda (2006)  
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principle presented in Myerson (1979), the menu of contracts, which principal optimally 
offers to the agent, contains the same number of contracts as is the number of types of 
agents and each agent chooses the contract which is designed for his type. The equilibrium 
is separating if these optimal contracts for different types of agents are different and if the 
same contracts are chosen by all types then the pooling equilibrium takes place.24 The 
optimization model connected with this adverse selection problem can be seen in 
Appendix-1. 
 
The model described above is a general case of a principal-agent adverse selection problem. 
Later in the paper I will draw some further implications from it that will serve us for 
deriving conclusions about the possible solution of the adverse selection problem.  
 
The next part in the discussion will move the focus from a generalized principal-agent 
adverse selection problem to its use in describing a lender-borrower relationship. In his 
continuation of the above model, Janda (2006) introduces the use of collateral as a means of 
signaling the borrower quality. 
He starts out by considering a risk neutral agent who wants to undertake a project. The 
project has two outcomes: ° 1X = (failure) and °X X= (success). The investment required 
for the project is (1, )I XÎ . Again the agent can be of two types L or H, with probabilities 
of success 0 1L Hp p< < <  for the “low” and “high” type respectively. The agent has a 
collaterizable wealth W and he borrows the investment finance I  from a risk-neutral 
principal. Again as in the previous case the principal does not know the type of the 
borrower. He knows only that the proportion of type L borrowers in the population is q , 
and he doesn’t know the return realization of the project and he is able to learn the 
realization only if he imposes bankruptcy upon a borrower and takes over the project. If the 
principal takes over the project or the collateral C W£ , he valuates them as °Xa  and Ca , 
respectively, with 0 1a< < . The model continues with introducing a debt contract ( , )R C , 
that requires the agent to pay the amount R upon completion of the project. If the amount is 
                                                  
24 See Janda (2006), p.3 
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not paid by the agent, the principal has the right to force him into a bankruptcy, which 
means taking over the project along with the collateral amount C . The principal’s 
maximization problem is given in Appendix 2.  
 
The more interesting part of the model for us is the equilibrium solution given by the 
following separating contracts for each type of borrower: 
 
*
*
0 ,
(1 )
L
L
L
L
C
I pR
p
a
=
- -
= , 
for a low type borrower and 
 
*
*
,*
( )( )
,
(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )
,
H L
H
H L L H
H H NR
H
H
p p IC
p p p p
I p C
R
p
a
a
a
- -
=
- - -
- - +
=
   
for a high type borrower. 
By showing the above results, Janda (2006) concludes that the high (good) type agent 
distinguishes himself from the low (bad) type by pledging the collateral *HC . Janda (2006) 
continues that “since the high (good) type of agent has a lower probability of default, he is 
more willing to pledge a given level of collateral, because the same absolute level of 
collateral means for him lower expected transfer to the principal than would be the case for 
low (bad) type of agent with low probability of success.”25 
 
                                                  
25 Janda (2006), p.7 
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From the above model, we can deduct implications for a similar case by replacing the 
investor with a bank. We can infer that a “bad” type borrower signals for his quality by not 
pledging a collateral, * 0LC = , while the “good” type borrower pledges collateral 
*
HC . 
 
Since the collateral in the “good” case is determined mainly by the probabilities of success 
of the two types of borrowers and the amount of investment I , we can admit that there is a 
similarity between the pledging of collateral and purchasing a credit rating which also 
constitutes a certain amount as a cost to the borrower and which also is linked to the costs 
of borrowing money from the bank. Therefore, from the point of view of the bank 
(investor), there exists a certain similarity in the signaling functions of the collateral and the 
credit rating, because as I showed in the beginning of section 4, a risky (bad) borrower will 
also abstain from purchasing a rating similarly to the “bad” borrower in the above case who 
will abstain from pledging a collateral.  
 
4.1.2 Solicited and Unsolicited Ratings.26 
In Section 3 the differences between solicited and unsolicited ratings were mentioned in 
connection with the roles of ECAIs. A model developed by Bannier and Tyrell (2005) 
explores this area more deeply and we can derive some implications about the adverse 
selection problem discussed in the present paper. 
 
The model starts out with the assumption that the firm’s quality is a normally distributed 
random variable ( ,1 / )N y aq : . It is also assumes that the distribution is common 
knowledge in the market and can be referred to as public information. The lower a , the 
higher is the firm’s fundamental risk, since the firm quality q  may deviate strongly from 
the ex-ante expected value y . The investor’s private interpretation of the public 
information about firm’s quality is expressed as ( ,1 / )ix N bq q: . The higher b , the more 
closely are investors’ private signals distributed around the unknown firm quality q  or 
                                                  
26 The model shown in this subsection is a shortened version of  the adverse selection model developed in 
Bannier/Tyrell (2005), only these parts of the model are presented which lead to important implications for 
the issues concerned in this paper 
 22
b simply denotes the precision of investors’ private information. Similarly, the agency’s 
private signal about the firm quality is  ( ,1 / )Ax N cq q: . The model also points out that 
the signals are independent of each other.  
 
The model continues by outlining a time line consisting of three periods: 
· In 0t = , the firm has an outstanding debt that has to be repaid at a rate of R  per 
unit of debt at maturity ( 2)t =  
· In 1t = , the investors and the rating agency observe their private signals ix  and Ax  
respectively. The agency publicly announces the rating z , according to which 
investors update their beliefs and decide on whether to prolong the credit or 
withdraw early. An early withdrawal means a payment of 1 per unit of capital.  
· In 2t =  the firm’s project matures successfully, if a proportion of less than q  of 
outstanding debt has been withdrawn prematurely. Consequently the firm repays 
debt out of the realized project payoff equal to V, otherwise the firm defaults.  
 
Then the model continues with two opposite cases – with and without the participation of a 
credit rating agency. 
 
Firstly, the model considers a case without a rating agency. In this case investors are left to 
base their decisions of whether to prolong the credit or withdraw, solely on the common 
prior information about  q  and on their private signals ix . Provided that private 
information is sufficiently precise, a unique equilibrium can be derived, which is 
characterized by trigger strategies so that each investor extends his loan whenever he 
obtains a private signal ix  higher than a trigger equilibrium value 
*
Wx  and withdraws credit 
otherwise. Similarly, the firm defaults if a quality value lower than *Wq is realized. The 
project will be successful only if the firm’s fundamental value q  is sufficiently high, i.e. 
*
Wq q> . Thus, the marginal investor will be indifferent between foreclosing and extending 
credit if both actions deliver the same expected payoff: 
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*1 ( , )W iR prob x zq q= × ³ .           (1) 
If there is no credit rating agency on the market, investors’ posterior beliefs about q  are 
given by: 
                 
1( , )ii
ay bx
x N
a b a b
q
+
+ +
:              (2) 
Plugging this equation into (1) gives us the indifference condition for the individual 
investor: 
     
* * 1 1
W W
a b a a b Rx y
b b b R
q -+ + -æ ö= - - F ç ÷
è ø
.      (3) 
The firm’s projects, however, need a critical mass of investment in order to proceed 
successfully. This condition also can be interpreted as the firm’s ability to refinance 
internally a certain amount of withdrawn debt. This amount that the firm can refinance is 
translated into firm’s quality. For simplicity the model assumes that the firm has to default 
whenever the proportion of withdrawn debt, denoted by l  is higher than the firm quality q . 
Therefore, the firm will be on the brink of default if: 
*( )Wl prob x xq q= = £  
                         ( ( ))ib xq q= F - .                  (4)                   
 
The model continues with the introduction of an equilibrium threshold value *Wq  derived 
from (3) and (4) below which firm’s projects will be abandoned since the proportion of 
withdrawn capital is too high for the firm to be warranted further internal refinancing. For 
values *Wq q>  the project will be continued. The withdrawal of capital is yet sufficiently 
small for the firm to avoid a default. The value *Wq  is given by: 
* * 1 1( )W W
a a b Ry
b Rb
q q -
æ ö+ -æ ö= F - - Fç ÷ç ÷ç ÷è øè ø
. 
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The model seeks a unique equilibrium for which to take place, the indifference conditions 
(3) and (4) should not cross more than once. The model concludes that the sufficient 
condition for unique equilibrium requires that behavioral uncertainty represented by the 
variance of investors private signals, 1 / b , does not become too big as compared to 
fundamental uncertainty represented by the variance of the firm’s quality value q . 
 
Now we move to the case in which there exists a rating agency which announces rating 
z which brings additional information to the market and investors update their beliefs to:                             
1, ,ii
ay bx dz
x z N
a b d a b d
q
+ +æ ö
ç ÷+ + + +è ø
:  
 
Thus the unique equilibrium value for the firm’s quality with the presence of a rating 
agency becomes: 
 
* * * 11 1( ) ( ) Ra y d z a b d
Rb
q q q -
æ öæ ö-æ ö= F - + - - + + Fç ÷ç ÷ç ÷
è øè øè ø
 
An assumption for simplicity is that the rating z is exogenously given and is normally 
distributed with variance 1 / d . 
Then the model states the equilibrium value for private signals given by: 
* * 1 1a b d a d a b d Rx y z
b b b b R
q -+ + + + -æ ö= - - - F ç ÷
è ø
 
Thus for quality values higher than *q the firm will not default because a sufficient number 
of investors will decide to prolong credit.  
 
Backed up by the above analysis we now move to the essential part of the model where as 
shown above the ex-ante probability of default is given by  
* *( ) ( ) ( ( ))prob default prob a yq q q= £ = F -  
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A logical conclusion is that the likelihood of default increases in equilibrium value *q  so 
that all model parameters that reduce *q will automatically reduce the probability of default 
as well. The model further assumes that with rational expectations, investors will learn that 
the rating’s precision d is given by  2 1 2(1 ) (1 )r a r r c- + - -
27. Plugging this into the 
equilibrium equation for q  delivers  
( ) ( ) ( )* *2 1 1 2
*
1
2 1 2
(2 ) (1 ) 1
1
1(2 ) (1 )
a r y r z r r c z
Rb r a b r r c
R
q q
q
-
æ öæ ö- - - - + - - - -
ç ÷ç ÷
= F ç ÷ç ÷-æ ö- + + - - Fç ÷ç ÷ç ÷
è øè øè ø
 
From the equation above we can see that the probability of default decreases in the ex-ante 
expected firm quality, y , in the announced rating, z , and in the offered repayment rate, R . 
Now we proceed to the next step of comparing the equilibrium value *q  with the 
equilibrium value without the presence of a rating agency *Wq : 
* *
Wq q>  Û  
* * 1
1 1 2 2 1 2
1 11 (1 ) ( * ) (2 ) (1 )W
c Rr r r z a b r a b r r c
a a R
q q q - -é ù æ ö é ù- > - + - - - + F + - - + + - -ç ÷ê ú ë ûë û è ø
 
Thus, the above inequality finds that the introduction of a rating agency reduces the 
probability of default (by reducing the interval in which default occurs with certainty from 
*[0, ]Wq  to [0, *]q  as long as *q  lies  sufficiently below z , i.e. as long as the rating agency 
announces a sufficiently high rating. In this case the l.h.s. of the above equality will be 
positive and the r.h.s. will be negative and the equality will be satisfied. 
 
                                                  
27 1r  is the weight attached to the competitive argument of the utility function of the rating agency, which 
comes from the assumption that a rating agency has a competitive aim which induces the CRA to reduce her 
risk of either losing the firm as a future customer by announcing a below average rating, or of losing investors 
as users of her information-provision by announcing inflated ratings that might increase  their portfolio risk 
substantially. 2r is the weight of a feedback argument which represents the feedback-effect which is states 
that the CRA should try not to contribute to an (inefficient) firm default via the announcement of her rating  
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Thus, Bannier and Tyrell (2005) conclude from their model that “…for firms that are able 
to confide sufficiently optimistic information about business prospects to the CRA despite a 
pessimistic prior expected firm quality, the probability of default will decrease after the 
announcement of a rating.”28 They consider this statement as a contribution to their “private 
information hypothesis”, that relates the difference between solicited and unsolicited 
ratings to an adverse selection problem.  
 
The core conclusion for our examination is that again there exist certain similarity between 
the case described in this subsection and the problem of adverse selection that we are 
discussing in this paper. If we assume that an unrated firm in Basel II remains unrated 
because it is of the “bad” type, then it is similar to a firm which has an unsolicited rating 
and remains with it because firms solicit a rating “whenever they believe to be able to 
disclose much more optimistic private information to the CRA than what has a priori been 
expected.”29 These findings have some important implications for the implementation of 
Basel II, which will be outlined in the next section.  
 
4.2 Risk mitigation and Implications from Basel II.  
As we have seen in the previous sections, there exists a conceptual problem in the 
Standardized Approach in Basel II. While risky borrowers who have a rating are risk 
weighted at 150 percent, the unrated borrowers are risk-weighted at 100 percent which 
poses an adverse selection problem. The reason for this comes mainly from the uncertainty 
in the risk of an unrated borrower. Thus, the main purpose of Basel II to promote financial 
stability through making the risk-management systems more robust and responsive to 
tackle the complexities arising out of new kinds of risks, is threatened.  
 
The adverse selection problem stated above may lead to serious consequences for the 
banking institution using standardized approach. In contrast to the standardized approach, 
under the IRB approach, high quality corporate lending attracts a lower capital charge 
                                                  
28 Bannier/Tyrell (2005), p.19 
29 Bannier/Tyrell (2005), p.19 
 27
which corresponds to the internal rating assigned by the bank, while low quality borrowers 
require a higher capital charge than the 8 percent under Basel I. Under IRB therefore banks 
will prefer high quality than low quality borrowers, while banks under the standardized 
approach will have relatively greater incentive to lend to lower quality borrowers 
particularly those that are not externally rated given that they will still attract an 8 percent 
capital requirement irrespective of the underlying risk. The possibility that high risk 
borrowers will migrate to banks under the standardized approach poses a risk for less 
sophisticated banks and for the financial systems in general. 30 
 
How can these risks be neutralized? The most strongly emphasized risk mitigation tool 
proposed by the Basel Committee is the introduction of eligible financial collateral (e.g. 
cash, gold, debt securities). According to the Accord, a collateralized transaction is one in 
which banks have a credit exposure or potential credit exposure and that credit exposure or 
potential credit exposure is hedged in whole or in part by collateral posted by the 
counterparty or by a third party on behalf of the counterparty.31The Basel II Accord 
provides two approaches for risk-weighting of the collateral – simple and comprehensive.  
 
In the simple approach the risk weight of the collateral instrument collateralizing or 
partially collateralizing the exposure is substituted for the risk weight of the counterparty. 
For the collateral to be recognized it must be pledged for at least the life of the exposure 
and must be marked to market and revalued with a minimum frequency of six months.  
 
In the comprehensive approach, when taking collateral banks will need to calculate 
adjusted exposure to the counterparty for capital adequacy purposes in order to take 
account of the effects of the collateral. Banks are required to adjust both the value of the 
exposure and the value of the collateral, using haircuts, so that they can be able to take 
account of possible future fluctuations in the value of either. Under the comprehensive 
                                                  
30 See Akhtar (2006), p.11 
31 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004), p.26 
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approach, for a collateralized transaction, the exposure amount after risk mitigation is 
calculated as follows: 
 
 
 
* max{0,[ (1 ) (1 )]}E E He C Hc Hfx= ´ + - ´ - -  
 
 
where: 
*E  = the exposure value after risk mitigation 
E  = the current value of the exposure 
He = haircut appropriate to the exposure 
C  = the current value of the collateral received 
Hc  = haircut appropriate to the collateral 
Hfx  = haircut appropriate for currency mismatch between the collateral and the exposure 
 
As we have seen in the model of Janda (2006) pledging of collateral can not only serve as a 
good risk mitigation technique with regard to securing the exposure amount,  can also serve 
as a good signal for the bank for the quality of the borrower. Therefore, using collateral 
should be promoted by the Basel Accord as an appropriate measure for risk mitigation and 
decreasing the effects of the adverse selection thus decreasing the risk at which the bank 
exposures itself.  
 
The requirement of collateral should be accompanied by an effective credit contract design 
which can be used for screening of the quality of the counterparties. Such contract design 
was presented in Janda (2006) where two different types of contracts were designed for the 
“good” and “bad” types of borrowers where each type will have the incentive to choose the 
contract which is designed for him. In addition, a proper loan pricing strategy may also 
serve as a screening technique. 
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Another way of decreasing risks in debt contracts can be introduced as an appropriate loan 
commitment contract which states that the borrower will have future borrowing benefits 
from the bank if he completes the current contract. 
In general, the regulatory framework under which the banks are operating should be 
balanced in such way that banks’ commercial interests should be made consistent with the 
supervisory interests regulating the banking institutions. 
 
5. Conclusion. 
Basel II is recognized to be a necessary step in the development of financial regulation and 
supervision. The transition from Basel I to Basel II has brought more complicated system 
of risk assessment, mitigation and management systems and has offered financial industry 
innovative and sophisticated approaches to weighting risks. 
 
Although, the New Accord has proven to be more flexible in assessing risks, its design 
poses some challenges for the banks which adopt its approaches. This is especially true for 
the banks under the standardized approach which have to use external credit ratings to 
assess the risk weights for their counterparties. The banks are facing an adverse selection 
problem in that unrated risky borrowers may decide to take advantage of the 100% risk 
weight attributed to them and remain unrated and thus receive cheaper loans while at the 
same time exposing the bank to credit risk. Since the bank cannot identify the true 
borrowers’ quality it needs to apply some screening and risk mitigation techniques which 
may decrease their exposure at risk. The implications for banks under the standardized 
approach are that they will have relatively greater incentive lending to more risky and 
unrated borrowers since the capital requirement for them is 8% as in Basel I.  
 
The problem can be solved by requiring a collateral and applying different screening 
techniques to reveal the quality of the borrower. One such method can be a better design of 
the credit contracts which separates “bad” type from “good” type by providing incentive for 
each type to choose the contract designed for them.  
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Appendix 1 
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Where ( )Bu w  and ( )Gu w are the utilities for the G type and B type respectively and where 
the first two constraints are participation constraints and the second two are incentive 
compatibility constraints   
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Appendix 2 
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Where , { , }i j L HÎ . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
